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Abstract 
 
Over the last 50 years the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights 
have built an unprecedented record in the field of international dispute settlement, not only by 
delivering hundreds of judgments on a diversity of issues every year but also by compelling the 
compliance of European states with their rulings. The compulsory nature of their jurisdiction, 
their ability to engage not only states but individuals and national courts in the adjudication 
process, and the high degree of economic, political and cultural homogeneity of the litigants are 
some of the factors accounting for such remarkable performance. This Article examines the 
origin, structure and main features of both courts, as well as their similarities and differences in 
terms of law applied, jurisdiction and litigation pattern. Mention is also made to the potential for 
overlapping jurisdiction stemming from recent developments such as the incorporation into 
European Community law of the human rights standards embodied in the European Convention 
of Human Rights. 
 
                                           
* Lawyer, U.N. Officer, Department for General Assembly and Conference Management, United Nations, New 
York. Lawyer-Linguist (on leave), Court of Justice of the European Communities, Luxembourg. The views 
expressed are those of the author and should not be attributed to the United Nations or the European Court of Justice.    
By all accounts, the role of the European Courts as international dispute settlement 
mechanisms over the last 50 years has been extremely successful. Indeed, the heavy caseloads of 
both the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), 
with each court delivering several hundred judgments every year,
1 show that, to a certain extent, 
they even are victims of their own success. 
 
There are a number of reasons that account for such a remarkable performance: the ability 
to engage not only states but individuals and national courts in the process of adjudication, the 
states’ commitment to abide by and enforce the judgments of the Courts and the high degree of 
economic, political and cultural homogeneity of the countries, citizens and institutions involved 
are some of them. However, underlying all these factors is the fact that the ECJ and the ECHR 
are the judicial bodies of two international organizations committed to a common objective: to 
secure peace and prosperity in Europe and to achieve an ever closer union among its peoples.
2 
The emphasis on integration, prosperity and peace should not come as a surprise, since, in some 
way, both organizations were born of a war. The Council of Europe and what was later to 
                                           
1 In 2005 alone, over one thousand cases were brought to a close by the European Court of Justice (574 by the Court 
of Justice and 610 by the Court of First Instance) whereas the European Court of Human Rights delivered 1105 
judgments. See http://www.curia.eu.int/en/actu/communiques/cp06/info/cp060014en.pdf, for the ECJ, and 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2006/Jan/President'spressconference2006.htm, for the ECHR (last accessed Apr. 
11, 2006). 
2 Preamble of the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Community [hereinafter EC Treaty], Mar. 25, 1957, 
consolidated text published in O.J. (C 325), Dec. 24, 2002, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12002E/htm/12002E.html (last accessed Apr. 11, 2006). Similarly, Article 1, paragraph (a), of 
the Treaty of London establishing the Council of Europe states: “The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a 
greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are 
their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress”, Treaty establishing the Council of 
Europe, May 5, 1949, E.T.S. No. 1, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/001.htm (last 
accessed Apr. 11, 2006). 
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become the European Union were created in the wake of World War II by people who believed 
that disputes could be best settled by peaceful means and multilateral engagement and were 
determined to prevent in the future the conditions that led to the war. Therefore, it was only 
natural that both international organizations came to create permanent judicial structures to which 
their disputes could be referred to obtain legally binding decisions.
3
 
There are, of course, substantial differences between the two European Courts in terms of 
membership, structure and jurisdiction but the truth remains that they share a pan-European 
perspective and have been highly successful in dealing with disputes related to the international 
instruments that created them. This Article briefly examines the origin, structure and main 
features of both courts and their jurisdiction and analyses some of the reasons behind their 
success as mechanisms for the settlement of international disputes in Europe. 
 
 
The European Court of Justice 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Communities (as its full name stands)
4 is based in 
Luxembourg and is the final arbiter in disputes arising from the EC Treaties and the legislation 
                                           
3 These are the basic elements that, according to J. G. Merrills, define adjudication as a method of international 
dispute settlement. See J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 121 (1998). 
4 The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, signed on October 29, 2004, and not yet into force [hereinafter 
Constitutional Treaty], changes the Court’s name to “Court of Justice of the European Union”, O.J. (C 310), Dec. 16, 
2004, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12004V/htm/12004V.html (last accessed Apr. 11, 
2006). 
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based upon them. It is one of the 5 institutions
5 of the European Union and, according to Article 
220 of the EC Treaty, has a general responsibility “to ensure that in the interpretation and 
application of the Treaties the law is observed”. The Court consists of 25 judges, one from each 
Member State, appointed by their governments for a six-year term.
6 The judges are assisted by 8 
advocates-general, appointed in the same way and for identical term, whose task is to make 
“reasoned submissions” in open court on the cases upon which the Court is required to 
adjudicate.
7
 
  The origins of the Court can be traced back to the Treaty establishing the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC), signed in Paris on April 18, 1951.
8 Despite its limited scope, the 
ECSC was a new type of inter-state entity, quite distinct from the classical model of international 
organization based on intergovernmental cooperation: it “deliberately broke with the concept of 
state sovereignty, subordinating its six Member States [...] to the overriding supranational power 
of its executive organ, the High Authority”.
9 Among the institutions established by the Treaty 
was a Court of Justice, responsible for settling the disputes arising in the newly created common 
market for coal and steel. 
 
                                           
5 The other UE institutions are: the Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors (Article 7 of 
the EC Treaty and Article 5 of the TUE). This institutional framework was slightly altered by the Constitutional 
Treaty, which distinguishes between five main institutions (European Parliament, European Council, Council of 
Ministers, European Commission and Court of Justice) and two secondary ones (European Central Bank and Court 
of Auditors). See Articles I-19, I-30 and I-31 of the Constitutional Treaty. 
6 EC Treaty, Articles 221 and 223. 
7 EC Treaty, Article 222. 
8 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty]. 
9 NEVILLE MARCH HUNNINGS, THE EUROPEAN COURTS 15 (1996). 
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The Treaties establishing the European Economic Community (EEC)
10 and the European 
Atomic Energy Community (EAEC),
11 signed in Rome on March 25, 1957, expanded the scope 
of the Court’s jurisdiction, as wider economic and social objectives were added to the original 
ones, such as the establishment of a common market based on the so-called four freedoms (free 
movement of goods, persons and capital and freedom to provide services) and the adoption of 
common policies in certain fields (from agriculture and fisheries to transportation, state aids and 
rules on competition).
12
 
Since the signing of the EEC Treaty, a number of amendments affecting the Court both 
directly and indirectly have been made. Some of them were purely technical, such as changes in 
the number of judges as membership rose from the original six to the current 25. Others were 
more significant, such as the creation of a Court of First Instance (CFI), attached to the ECJ by 
the Single European Act (1986),
13 to help reduce its already heavy caseload.
14 In 1992, the scope 
of European integration was substantially enlarged with the signing of the Treaty on European 
Union (EU Treaty or TUE).
15 This Treaty “superimposed on the three existing Communities a 
new structure called the European Union with jurisdiction in two areas falling outside the scope 
of the original Treaties, namely, foreign and security policy [...] and justice and home affairs”,
16 
                                           
10 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. 
11 298 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter EAEC Treaty]. 
12 EC Treaty, Articles 2 and 3. 
13 Signed on Feb. 17 and 28, 1986, the Single European Act entered into force on Jul. 1, 1987, O.J. (L 169), June 29, 
1987, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/selected/livre510.html (last accessed Apr. 11, 2006). 
14 This judicial body is renamed “General Court” by Article I-29 of the Constitutional Treaty. 
15 Signed in Maastricht on Feb. 7, 1992, the EU Treaty entered into force on Nov. 1, 1993, O.J. (C 191), July 29, 
1992, available at http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html (last accessed Apr. 11, 2006). 
16 ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 5-6 (1999). 
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practically all of which was initially excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court. The EEC 
became the European Community (EC), which among its new goals included the establishment 
of an economic union and the launching of a single currency.
17
 
From an international dispute settlement perspective three features of the European Court 
of Justice are worthy of mention. First of all, the golden rule of international dispute adjudication, 
the principle of consensuality,
18 does not apply to the ECJ: its jurisdiction is compulsory and its 
judgments directly enforceable. There is no optional clause in the European Treaties and 
membership of the Communities entails irrevocable acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court 
and the binding nature of its judgments. 
                                           
17 Apart from the four founding treaties (ECSC, EEC, EAEC and EU Treaties) and the Single European Act, two 
other major instruments (the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice) brought important institutional changes and 
introduced new areas of responsibility for the ECJ. The Treaty of Amsterdam (signed on Oct. 2, 1997, and in force 
since May 1, 1999), amended and renumbered the EC and EU Treaties and widened the Court’s powers in new areas 
such as asylum, immigration, free movement of persons and judicial cooperation. Treaty of Amsterdam amending 
the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and related acts, O.J. (C 340), 
Nov. 10, 1997, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/amsterdam.html (last accessed Apr. 11, 2006). 
The Treaty of Nice (signed on Feb. 26, 2001, and entered into force on Feb. 1, 2003), was meant to prepare the 
European institutions for the accession of 10 new Member States and established a new division of competencies 
between the ECJ and the CFI. Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and certain related acts, O.J. (C 80), Mar. 10, 2001, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12001C/htm/12001C.html (last accessed Apr. 11, 2006). As for the jurisdictional structure of 
the Union, the Treaty of Nice provided for the creation of specialized judicial panels, such as the new European 
Union Civil Service Tribunal, established on Nov. 2, 2004. This court, composed of seven judges, adjudicates at first 
instance in disputes between the EU and its civil service. Its decisions are subject to appeal to the CFI on questions 
of law only and, in exceptional cases, to review by the Court of Justice. See Council Decision 2004/752/EC, 
Euratom, establishing the European Union Civil Service Tribunal, Nov. 2, 2004, O.J. (L 333), Nov. 9, 2004, 
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004D0752:EN:HTML (last 
accessed Apr. 11, 2006). 
18 MERRILLS, supra note 3, at 122. 
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Secondly, the ECJ recognises ius standi not only for Member States and EU institutions
19 
but also for private parties. Although, as observed by some analysts, individuals cannot “take a 
case to Luxembourg” to seek redress in the context of a private dispute,
20 they have access to the 
Court in defense of their rights under the Treaties and therefore can sue for judicial review of 
Community acts as well as for damages for harm caused by the EU or its civil servants. Coupled 
with this individual right of access is the fact that private parties are entitled to apply directly to 
national courts to have EC law enforced,
21 a right which is intimately related to the third main 
feature of the ECJ dispute settlement system: the close interaction between European and 
national courts. 
 
Such interaction takes place through the so-called “reference for preliminary rulings” 
mechanism, provided for in Article 234 of the EC Treaty.
22 Aimed at preventing national courts 
                                           
19 In the so-called infringement cases, a Member State failing to fulfil its obligations under Community law can be 
brought before the Court by the Commission (most commonly) or by another Member State (proceedings for failure 
to fulfil an obligation, EC Treaty, Articles 226 to 228). Actions can also be brought against one of the Community 
institutions by Member States or the other institutions either to review the legality of its acts (proceedings for 
annulment, EC Treaty, Article 230) or to obtain a pronouncement that it unlawfully failed to act when required to do 
so (proceedings for failure to act, EC Treaty, Article 232).  
20 HUNNINGS, supra note 9, at 17. 
21 EC law is considered to generate rights in favour of individuals directly enforceable before the national courts. See 
generally, Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse administratie der belastingen, E.R.C. 1 (1963) [hereinafter 
Van Gend en Loos case]. 
22 Article 234 of the EC Treaty states: 
“The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: 
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty; 
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community and of the ECB; 
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the Council, where those statutes so provide. 
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from interpreting and applying the Treaty provisions differently, this mechanism has enabled the 
Court to develop a set of fundamental principles of the EC law, including direct effect and 
supremacy of Community law, that truly differentiate the Community legal order from classical 
public international law.
23 The principle of direct effect was first recognised by the Court in its 
judgment in the Van Gend en Loos case
24 and implies that the Treaties are not mere 
intergovernmental agreements creating rights and obligations for Member States and EC 
institutions, but are the foundation of a separate legal order conferring rights and imposing 
obligations on individuals. In Van Gend en Loos the Court not only concluded that individuals, 
like Member States, had rights, but also granted them the means of giving those rights direct 
effect at the national level. 
 
The direct effect of EC legislation was reinforced by the principle of supremacy, the goal 
of which was to prevent national courts from declaring Community rules inapplicable in favor of 
national ones. In the Court’s words, “the law stemming from the Treaty […] could not, because 
of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, 
without being deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of the 
Community itself being called into question”.
25 By setting up this principle, the Court established 
                                                                                                                                          
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it 
considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to 
give a ruling thereon. 
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State 
against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter 
before the Court of Justice.” 
23 See Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE LAW JOURNAL 2419 (1991). 
24 See Van Gend en Loos case, supra note 20, at 12. 
25 Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, E.C.R. 585, at 593 (1964). 
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a doctrine which allowed the new EC legal order to prevail over not only national legislation, but 
also the constitutions of the Member States.
26
 
The national courts have widely accepted these principles and willingly use Article 234 of 
the EC Treaty to make references to the ECJ, honoring the binding nature of its pronouncements. 
Indeed, the Court’s success has been such that, as Professors Helfer and Slaughter point out, it is 
“popularly credited with the transformation of the Treaty of Rome from an international 
agreement into the constitution of the European Union, by convincing national courts to apply 
European Union law directly and supremely to national law”.
27
 
Leaving aside the controversy between those who consider the ECJ a state-like 
constitutional court and those who emphasise its public international law character,
28 the truth 
remains that the ECJ has played “a substantial role in furthering the objectives laid down in the 
Treaties, a role similar to that played by the United States Supreme Court with respect to the U.S. 
Constitution”.
29 In this connection, Professor Eeckhout observes that, to a certain extent, the 
                                           
26 The primacy of Community law over constitutional law was established in case 11/70, Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft, E.C.R. 1125 (1970). 
27 Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Towards a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 
YALE LAW JOURNAL 307-308 (1997). 
28 For a summary of the arguments of both sides, see generally Gil Carlos Rodríguez Iglesias, Le pouvoir judiciaire 
de la Communauté européenne au stade actuel de l’évolution de l’Union, JEAN MONNET CHAIR PAPERS OF THE 
ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE (1996), available at http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/WP-Texts/96_41.html (last accessed Apr. 
11, 2006) and Jean Allain, The European Court of Justice Is an International Court, 68 NORDIC JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 261-271 (1999). 
29 TIMOTHY BAINBRIDGE & ANTHONY TEASDALE, THE PENGUIN COMPANION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 99 (1996). 
On similiarities between the ECJ and the U.S. Supreme Court, see generally Steven A. Bibas, The European Court 
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Court has performed an “activist” role in the interpretation of Community law, filling in the gaps 
and construing the Treaties “so as to render the legal system [created by them] coherent and 
complete”.
30 As a result, it has gone far beyond its initial functions as a mechanism of inter-state 
dispute settlement to become one of the driving forces behind the process of European 
integration. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights 
 
Compared with the ECJ, the role of the ECHR has been much more modest, although it 
has also succeeded in making its judgments as effective as national court rulings. Many of its 
singular features result from the specialized human rights jurisdiction distinguishing it from the 
ECJ, with which it nonetheless shares a European perspective.
31
 
The ECHR was set up in 1959 as a structure for the enforcement of the rights enshrined 
by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
32 
Adopted under the auspices of the Council of Europe, the Convention, like the Treaty of Rome, 
contained a judicial body for dispute resolution, albeit limited to the specific field of human 
rights. Indeed, in addition to laying down a catalogue of rights, largely inspired by those 
embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted two years before, the 
                                                                                                                                          
of Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court: Parallels in Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence, 15 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 253 (1992). 
30 Piet Eeckhout, The European Court of Justice and the Legislature, 18 YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW 1 (1998). 
31 See HUNNINGS, supra note 9, at 305. 
32 Opened for signature in Rome, on Nov. 4, 1950, the European Convention of Human Rights entered into force on 
Sept. 3, 1953, E.T.S. No. 5, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (last accessed 
Apr. 11, 2006). 
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Convention established a structure for the enforcement of those rights.
33 Of the three institutions 
initially entrusted with this responsibility (the Commission, the ECHR and the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe), only the latter two survive. After the coming into force of 
Protocol No. 11 to the Convention,
34 the existing part-time Court and Commission were replaced 
by a single, full-time Court. 
 
The ECHR sits in Strasbourg and is composed of as many judges as there are Contracting 
Parties
35 (all of them, currently 46, also members of the Council of Europe). Judges are elected 
by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe for a term of six years.
36 According to 
the Convention as amended by Protocol No. 11, any Contracting Party (state application) or 
private person alleging to be a victim of a violation of the Convention (individual application) 
may bring legal proceedings against the state deemed responsible for the breach of any of the 
Convention rights.
37 Under the new regime, all Contracting Parties recognise the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court, whose final judgments are binding on the respondent states concerned.
38 
These are indeed two of the most important innovations of the “new” ECHR. 
 
                                           
33 See HUNNINGS, supra note 9, at 11. 
34 The Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
restructuring the control machinery established thereby, was opened for signature on May 11, 1994, and came into 
force on Nov. 1, 1998, E.T.S. No. 155, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/155.htm (last 
accessed Apr. 11, 2006). 
35 Article 20 of the Convention. 
36 Articles 22 and 23 of the Convention. 
37 Articles 33 and 34 of the Convention. 
38 Article 46, paragraph 1, of the Convention states: “The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final 
judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties”. 
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Prior to 1998, states could only “be made respondents with their consent, either given ad 
hoc or by means of an optional clause [...] accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in 
advance”.
39 On the other hand, the right of individual petition, which permitted individuals to sue 
any state party to the Convention (including their own), had to be exercised through the 
Commission (individuals did not have direct access to the Court) and was subject to another 
optional clause, which meant that such right was only available “if the state against whom an 
individual sought to bring a complaint had accepted in advance that such individual petitions 
might be made”.
40 As mentioned before, Protocol No. 11 abolished the two “optional clauses” 
and both the jurisdiction of the Court and the right of individual application are now compulsory 
for all Contracting Parties. Further, individuals have direct access to the Court in all cases. 
 
As far as relations with national courts are concerned, Professor Hunnings has observed 
that “the responsibility for ensuring compliance with the Convention rights lies with the [...] 
states themselves, through their administrative, legislative and, in the last resort, judicial 
procedures”.
41 That is why a victim of a violation of the Convention “must first seek remedy 
through domestic procedures within the state of injury”.
42 The rule of exhaustion of domestic 
remedies is clearly stated in Article 35 of the Convention, according to which: “The Court may 
only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the 
generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date 
on which the final decision was taken”. 
                                           
39 HUNNINGS, supra note 9, at 12. 
40 Id., at 13. 
41 Id., at 343. 
42 Id., at 342 
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In the ECHR there is no such thing as the EC references for preliminary rulings, which 
enable the ECJ to interact with the national courts. Rather, the ECHR approach is more 
hierarchical in that it acts as “a tribunal of last resort concerned only to supervise the [Contracting 
Parties] and ensure that they administer the Convention rights properly, refrain from breaching 
them and provide remedies when inadvertently they do”.
43
 
In any case, the ECHR has also accumulated an impressive record through the last five 
decades. First, the high rate of compliance with ECHR judgments have led some commentators 
to consider them “as effective as those of any domestic court”.
44 Second, just as the ECJ raised 
the European Community treaties to the constitutional level, the ECHR has established the 
constitutional status of its founding instrument,
45 while securing its own position “as the final 
interpreter of the Convention’s provisions”.
46 Third, the ECHR decisions have altered “the shape 
of domestic law, through both legislative revision and judicial decision”.
47 Indeed, in Professor J. 
G. Merrills’s words, “the most dramatic impact of the Court’s work is certainly to be found in the 
                                           
43 Id., at 342-343. 
44 BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 309 (2nd ed. 1995). 
45 The ECHR has stressed the “special character of the Convention as an instrument of European public order (ordre 
public) for the protection of individual human beings” and declared the Convention “a constitutional instrument of 
European public order”. See Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27, 31 (1995). 
46 Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 27, at 293. As for the Court’s position as final arbiter in matters of interpretation, 
see generally Barfod v. Denmark, 149 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12 (1989). 
47 Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 27, at 293. 
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changes in domestic law and practice which have been introduced as a result of cases at 
Strasbourg”.
48
 
Luxembourg and Strasbourg Compared  
 
As we have already mentioned, the ECJ and the ECHR have a great deal in common: they 
both are international courts with similar historical backgrounds and a common “pan-European 
mission and perspective”.
49 However, unlike traditional international courts, based on the 
principle of consensuality, the jurisdiction of the European Courts is compulsory. Enforcement 
also separates ECJ and the ECHR from other international adjudicatory bodies. Even though, as 
Professor Louis Henkin puts it, “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international 
law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time”,
50 the European Courts go beyond 
this pattern of usual, spontaneous compliance with international obligations since their judgments 
are binding and compliance is mandatory. Finally, the ECJ and the ECHR have both engaged in a 
fruitful relationship with national institutions and private parties, who enjoy direct access to 
them. 
 
These two latest features have led Professors Helfer and Slaughter to conclude that, rather 
than international courts, the ECJ and the ECHR should be defined as supranational courts. In 
their opinion, “although both tribunals have the power to adjudicate state-to-state disputes – the 
                                           
48 J. G. MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 12 
(1993). 
49 HUNNINGS, supra note 9, at 257. 
50 LOUIS N. HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (1979). 
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province of traditional international adjudication – each has compiled a more successful 
compliance record in cases involving private parties litigating directly against state governments 
or against each other”.
51 This has enabled both courts to “penetrate the surface of the state” and 
“interact directly with the main players in national legal systems”,
52 such as courts, 
administrative agencies and legislative bodies. As a consequence, the ECJ and the ECHR have 
been able to resort to “an additional set of potential mechanisms for compelling litigants to 
appear and to comply with the resulting judgments”.
53
 
Nevertheless, together with these similarities there are also striking differences. Both 
Courts, for example, apply a different type of legislation: the law the ECJ is tipically concerned 
with constitutes an autonomous legal order that creates rights and obligations for states, 
institutions and private persons,
54 whereas the ECHR deals with a specific body of norms – 
human rights law – which is “primarily defined by reaction to the national legal systems with 
which it interacts”.
55 The scope of their jurisdiction is also different, in that the ECJ’s power to 
adjudicate extends to a vast array of issues with far-reaching economic, social and political 
                                           
51 Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 27, at 277. 
52 Id. 
53 Id., at 289. 
54 In Van Gend en Loos, the ECJ declared that the EEC Treaty “is more than an agreement which merely creates 
mutual obligations between the contracting states”, adding that EC law “constitutes a new legal order of international 
law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the 
subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals”. Then, the ECJ went on to observe that 
Community law “not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which 
become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but 
also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the 
Member States and upon the institutions of the Community”. See Van Gend en Loos case, supra note 21, at 3. 
55 HUNNINGS, supra note 9, at 257. 
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implications. The ECHR, for its part, has a more limited jurisdictional function which consists in 
supervising – and compelling – compliance with a specific catalogue of human rights obligations 
in 46 countries. As for the pattern of litigation, only states can be sued before the ECHR, either 
by individuals or, less frequently, by other states. As pointed out by Professor Hennings, “these 
are precisely the two forms of litigation which are missing from the EC Courts”,
56 either because 
EC legislation deliberately excludes them, as is the case with claims by private parties against 
states, or through a long-established practice whereby states tend not to bring infringement 
actions against each other. 
 
Lastly, mention should be made of the potential for conflict between decisions emanating 
from both European Courts, particularly after the explicit incorporation into EC law of the human 
rights standards set forth in the European Convention of Human Rights.
57 This risk for 
overlapping jurisdiction is compounded by the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union and its subsequent inclusion in the Constitutional Treaty.
58 Some analysts 
                                           
56 Id. 
57 After declaring, as a general principle, that the European Union must respect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, upon which the Union is founded, the TUE provides that “the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [...] and as 
they result from the Constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community 
Law”. See Article 6 (1) and (2) of the TUE, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam. Moreover, Article 46 (d) of the 
TUE establishes that, whenever it has jurisdiction, the ECJ must ensure respect of these human rights standards by 
the Community institutions. See Elizabeth F. Defeis, Human Rights and the European Union: Who Decides? 
Possible Conflicts Between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, 19 DICK. J. 
INT’L L. 302 (2001). 
58 The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights was signed and proclaimed by the Presidents of the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission at the European Council meeting in Nice on Dec. 7, 2000. The Charter 
was later incorporated into the text of the Constitutional Treaty, making it legally binding not only on the Union and 
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have perceived these developments as setting the stage for a fracture in the jurisdictional system 
for human rights protection in Europe.
59 However, as observed by former ECJ Advocate General 
Francis G. Jacobs, that potential for divergent interpretation, inherent in the very existence of two 
independent judicial systems,
60 has not led to significant discrepancies between the two Courts.
61 
In order to avoid risks of conflicting interpretation of human rights standards it is nonetheless 
essential that the ECJ and the ECHR become even further acquainted with each other’s case-law 
and increase the mutually enriching interaction that already exists between them.
62
 
Conclusions 
 
  Since their inception the ECJ and the ECHR have built a remarkable record in the field of 
international dispute settlement, not only by delivering hundreds of judgments on a wide variety 
of issues but also by compelling the compliance of European states with their rulings. As we have 
mentioned, several factors explain this high degree of compliance: the compulsory nature of the 
Courts’ jurisdiction, the individuals’ right of direct access on a similar footing as European 
                                                                                                                                          
its institutions but also on Member States in regard to the implementation of Union law. See Part II  (Articles II-61 to 
II-114) of the Constitutional Treaty. 
59 Professor Toth, for example, considered such perspective “the worst possible scenario”, since it would amount to 
the creation of “a dual system of human rights protection in Europe and a splitting up of rights which would 
undermine the authority of the Convention and the Convention system”. See Akos G. Toth, The European Union and 
Human Rights: The Way Forward, 34 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 491-92 (1997). 
60 See Francis G. Jacobs, Judicial Dialogue and the Cross-Fertilization of Legal Systems: The European Court of 
Justice, 38 TEX. INT’L  L. J. 551 (2003). 
61 For an overview of inconsistencies in the approach to fundamental rights by the ECJ and the ECHR, see generally 
Defeis, supra note 57, at 317-28. 
62 The two courts approach each other’s work with deference and respect and are engaged in a fruitful judicial 
dialogue, which include regular meetings of their members to discuss general issues of mutual interest. See Jacobs, 
supra note 60, at 552. 
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institutions and Member States and the forging of mutually enriching relationships with national 
courts and institutions, either in the form of a partnership (ECJ) or in a more traditional, 
hierarchical way (ECHR). Even though, as regards the interpretation of human rights standards, 
there is certainly a potential for conflict between the decisions of the two Courts, divergences of 
approach have in fact been few and far between. Once again, the particular background of the 
process of European integration and the shared political, social, economic and legal values of the 
states concerned have favored the dialogue and interaction between the two judicial bodies, 
minimizing possible discrepancies and contributing to their success as dispute settlement 
mechanisms in Europe. 
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